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The military organization is crisis-oriented since the
ultimate goal of such an organization is to win the war.
Yet our past experience with the military organizations show
that they change a lot in their behavior and characteristics
when the transition from garrison to combat occurs.
Few studies have been made on the behavior of complex
civilian organizations when facing a crisis. Some of the
phenomena they observe are applicable to the military organ-
ization as well.
The amount and the magnitude of changes the military -
organization suffers when facing crisis might indicate that
only a few of the phenomena are addressed in advance through
training and by appropriate regulations.
An in-depth analysis is made of the changes through which
these factors of the military organization undergo while
transitioning from garrison to combat environment.
A questionnaire was administered to two groups of com-
manding officers in the American and the Israeli military
organization. The samples were selected from population of
officers with combat experience while in command.
Based on the survey, and the author's own experience as
a squadron commander in the 1973 war, this paper is looking
at the changes and the shift in priorities the military organ-
ization faces when crisis occurs. Recommendation for further
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW OF SUBJECT
One possible definition of the history of mankind is the
record of mankind's social reactions to crises. It seems
that man from earliest times found himself too weak to face
threats and difficulties by himself and that his ability to
survive was based on his skill at organization and unification
of efforts.
Organizations were formed to meet particular goals of
the group. The main thrust of rules, customs, obligations
and rights for the members of these organizations was cen-
tered upon goal achievement.
Obviously, there are as many kinds of organizations as
there are goals. Each organization has a unique set of
assumptions about its environment and the society with which
it is associated. The accuracy of these assumptions appears
crucial to the organization's ability to survive over a long
period of time. History is replete with examples of how
difficult it is to predict the phenomenon of the environment
in the present (to say noting of the future) . Experience
shows us, however, that organizational flexibility increases
the probability of successful response to changes and to
crises
.
Whenever a change in the environment occurs and it turns
out to be of a magnitude beyond that which was predicted
there is for the organization what will here be called a
10

crisis. The organization's ability to adjust to the new
environmental changes and still accomplish its goals is
central to its evolution or extinction.
B. CRISES IN ORGANIZATIONS
A crisis situation is created by the sudden introjection
of one or more additional commitments into an organization
whose life and schedule is already full. The effect of the
introjection is to create interference with the activities
of the organization and its ability to achieve its goals.
The following model is suggested to illustrate different
types of crises which organizations might face and the levels
































































































This model suggests that in any crisis and at any level
of the organization there is a need for different degrees of
expertise and resources both in quality and quantity.
Studies of organizations under crisis conditions which
look at the ability of these organizations to adapt to the
new demands in such a way as to still accomplish their goals
divide these organizations into four categories:
1. Established organizations which are doing their orig-




2. Established organizations that are doing work for
which they were not trained or contracted, e.g., military-
troops fighting fires or building flood dikes.
3. Emergent organizations that are expanded for the
crisis to do scheduled work, e.g., the Red Cross,
4. Emergent organizations that provide nonscheduled work
for which they were not trained, e.g., task forces of civilians
drawn together to study such natural disasters as earthquakes,
mine-fires , etc.
When an organization is well prepared for a crisis there
is no need for the second and fourth categories. However,
the great numbers of type two and 'type four organizations in
emergency situations suggests that organizations are not often
prepared to meet these crises adequately. It is felt that
prioritization of goals is especially troublesome to leaders
in these groups.
C. LEADERSHIP IN CRISIS SITUATIONS
The most difficult and at the same time most important
factor in an organization's reaction to a crisis is its
selection of its leader. Organizations which are formed to
operate in low turbulence environments may find the selection
process easier and more predictable. In organizations de-
signed to react to crises (e.g., military, police or fire
departments) it is more difficult to predict leadership
potent ial
.
Every day activities in peacetime or nonthreatening hours
are probably not very useful to predict leadership skills when
the organization is in the midst of its crisis.
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It will be shown that there is no lack of studies and
scales designed to analyze the traits and personalities of
great leaders in the past and to suggest ways of identifying
people with these traits from a future population.
Study of the history of the Jewish people, for example,
suggests two types of leaders:
1. The Prophetic Leader. This leader looks to the
future, sets goals to be achieved in that future state, sets
uncompromising milestones for those goals and makes great
demands of his or her followers. Weber would call this our
charismatic leader, observed in many moments in many nations.
2. The Priestly Leader. Wrapped up in the daily deal-
ings with here-and-now problems, this leader emerges to meet
the steady demand of a particular organization. Often this
leader has greater management ability than the prophetic
leader. He will usually possess more interpersonal skills.
Hopefully, the two types of leaders will act in consonance,
i.e., the priestly will attempt to implement what the prophetic
will relinquish to the priestly (that which he could not
institutionalize)
.
The existance of either type of leadership in the organi-
zation without the other tends to result in a gap in the
organizational structure between future and present needs.
Prophetic leaders tend to emphasize future needs and goals
and to structure the organization to meet those goals without
concerning or compromising with present needs. Priestly
leaders tend to solve the problems in the present situation
14

even if it leads to a large deviation from the planned structure
of the organization.
History has seemed to laud the prophetic and to ignore the
contributions of the priestly. Without limiting the importance
of the goals set by the prophetic leaders much more attention
is required toward the ability or inability of priestly leaders
to keep the organization directed toward goals accomplishment.
Crises are all too good measures of their handiwork.
D . SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis is to look at one type of
organization- -the military- -and to analyze what happens to its
organization and its leadership when moving from the priestly
to the prophetic, i.e., from garrison to a combat environment.
Effort will be made to illustrate the factors that effect this
trans ition.
Attempts will be made to summarize the experience of
officers who were made commanders of operational units that
took part in combat activities and in garrison life and to
observe what happened to their organizations.
No illusion of infallible predictions of the future is
imputed. Nor is this to be a model which commanders can use
to work their magic in future crises. It is, hopefully, an
attempt to begin scholarly dialog upon the subject of the
transition from garrison to combat and how younger officers
without combat experience might be developed to face this
crisis with maximum effectiveness.
15

II. A REVIEW OF GARRISON TO CRISIS TRANSITIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to cite some of the theory
behind leadership transitions along with military and civilian
examples of how organizations adapt to crises. Unfortunately,
no single source addressed complex military organizations in
this transition period with a focus upon how leaders shifted
their priorities. Some attempt is made to look at parts of
the process and to infer their application to the military
example.
The author looked first to readings in military history
to see if one could detect shifts in values and attitudes of
military leaders as they moved from garrison to combat envi-
ronments. Attention was given to the personal experiences of
commanders and to the organizational changes within their
forces
.
The writings of S. L. A. Marshall [12; 13; 14] and of John
Keegan [15] revealed examples of how individual leaders modi-
fied their personal involvement in ways beyond their tactics
and operational strategies. They dealt with fear, feelings,
anticipations and frustrations in rapidly changing environments
Moshe Dayan [1] , one of the greatest military leaders in
modern times, represents a creative and innovative contri-
bution to this subject. In his book, The Story of My Life
,
he
describes his personal feelings at different levels of command
in a series of crises, as a brigade commander in 1948, Chief
of Staff in 1957 and as Secretary of Defense in 1967 and in
16

1973 he illustrates some of the changes a leader experiences
in combat along with a maturing process.
The author hoped that a review of the speeches of high
ranking officers at different times (i.e., in garrison and
during hostilities) might also reveal a shift in values or
hierarchies of priorities. The author reviewed Vital Speeches
,
The Marine Corps Gazette and All Hands for statements by
chiefs of services. Surprisingly, no significant difference
in their goal statements can be seen between peacetime and
wartime.
The author reveiwed the literature available concerning
Britain's Royal Air Force [16] before and during World War II
along with the history of the Quartermaster Corps before and
during Pearl Harbor. Again, no significant differences could
be ascertained.
A. IMPACT UPON INDIVIDUALS DURING THE TRANSITION TO COMBAT
Perhaps the most well documented area associated with
emergency transitions is that pertaining to reactions of
individuals. It is, of course, easier and cheaper to inter-
view and to study individuals than to observe and to speak
for an entire expeditionary force. Biographies and auto-
biographies also provide rich feedback that includes much of
the emotional color of the transition period.
A study of three biographies revealed considerable personal
adjustment in the transition from garrison to combat. Ambrose
[18] and Donovan [19] described the changes in leadership and
decision-making style of General Dwight D. Eisenhower during
17

World War II. Reginald Thompson followed similar changes in
the thinking of Montgomery of Alamein [20] --not only in
strategy and tactics but also in his human feelings and con-
siderations. These descriptions are not unlike those recorded
by Moshe Dayan in his autobiography [1] during transition
periods. However, these accounts, while descriptive, resist
qualification.
Military sociologists Charles Moskos [21] and Morris
Janowitz [22; 23] described the ways in which individuals and
military organizations reacted to changes from stable to
turbulent environments. While these accounts are also de-
scriptive they focus more on changes in values and priorities
than on the particulars of differing leadership actions.
The "Yom Kippur War" and the hostile activities along the
Syrian and Egyptian borders that followed that war (1973) saw
Israel employ specialists to observe the stress upon individ-
uals and military units in the transition from peace to war.
Greenbaum, Rojovsky and Shalit [24] and Bahad and Solomon [25]
reported increased stress to staff and unit commanders. They
also suggested ways to make the transition less troublesome
in the future. Again, however, quantification was not
attempted.
B. INSIGHTS FROM CIVIL TRANSITIONS
Some important thoughts are to be in the civilian sector.
The Symposium of Emergency Operations [26; 27] held in Santa
Monica, California in 1966 and 1967 reported several of these




"Disasters, accidents and crises may strike anytime. Inter-
nationally, in 1966, major famine, floods, earthquakes and
epidemics victimized an estimated 20 million people, of
whom nearly 70,000 met an untimely death. . .These circum-
stances call for unexpected allocation of resoruces and man-
power to cope with circumstances not present in day to day
life. .
.
It is hoped that through advanced planning something
can be done to make these situations manageable ."
Allen H. Barton reported many of the effects of stress
upon organization [28] . Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russel R.
Dynes reported on how crises operations might parallel mili-
tary operations.
Still other studies focused upon the different skills
which managers must employ when their companies face crises.
Robert Katz [30] suggested a better way to select manager.
"This approach is based not on what good executives are
(i.e., their innate traits and characteristics) but rather
on what they do... The principle criterion of skillfulness
must be effective action under varying conditions."
Several comparisons were also made in studying how tra-
ditional, hierarchical organizations (like the military)
differ in their reaction to stress from matrix and nontra-
ditional organizations.
Of great concern to Max Weber [31; 32] was the role of
the charismatic leader in crises environments. His studies
of charismatic and situational leadership are classic. Charles
Perrow [33] looked at differences in structure and the organi-
zation's ability to react effectively to stress.
Beckhard and Harris [33] suggest new ways to look at
complex, large system changes as reactions to many stresses.
Meyer and Rowan [34] go on to suggest that traditional
19

structures are ill equipped to react to turbulent environments
today and that it may be only nostalgic to think that formal
structures could cope.
Related examples can be found in the work of Graham T.
Allison in his classic analysis of the Kennedy administration
during the Cuban missile crisis [35] . Old forms were dis-
carded and replaced by a small operations center of key
leaders
.
Another analysis of a government in crisis is given to us
by Dov Alexandrowicz who studied the activities of the Israeli
government in the immediate period prior to the 1967 War [36]
.
His psychiatric observations, coupled with descriptions offered
by Moshe Dayan [1] give a clearer description of why Israel
had to change its operational procedures to face that crisis.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF NEW TECHOLOGIES UPON ORGANIZATIONS
One of the fastest growing areas of concern, which coupled
with the tendency of increasing the level of decision-making
with the improvement in technology, is the area of C^ (command,
control and communication). Innovations in this area are meant
to offer top commanding echelons in the military the potential
capability to exercise remote control by communication directly
on a real-time basis with combat ready forces in the field.
Numerous studies in this area discuss the involvement of
top echelons in local combat decisions [37; 38; 39]. One
study [38] found that the President of the United States was
involved as a decision-maker in over 73 percent of the cases
20

between 1947-1875 although this involvement was legally re-
quired in only 22 percent of the cases. Furthermore, the
fact that extensive interagency coordination was required
by existing norms in over 58 percent of the cases (although
legally required in only 12 percent)
,
provides a strong
incentive to centralize control at the top so as to avoid the
critical delays in response. Analyzing the benefits of
better use of equipment and technology to indicate better
results of top echelons involvement in local combat problems
seems to refer solely to technical ability and to neglect
the impact this phenomena has upon the local commanding
officer and his unit. Technology in this area may have
already created organizational problems which will require
decades to solve.
In summary, the literature thus far reviewed contains
many useful observations about parts of the transition from
normalcy to crisis. Thus far, there has not been a systematic
and inclusive study of the entire process for military organi-
zation in more detail.
21

III. THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN CRISIS
Military organizations are structures which are supposedly
designed to function effectively in emergency conditions.
This is especially true for tactical units, of course, where
operational conditions usually include turbulence and rapid
changes. The function of tactical units is to cope with
pressures in this turbulence and to overcome the forces of
the changed environment.
Responsiveness to emergency conditions at the head-
quarters level is seldom a quick or smooth process. Signals
may be less clear. A momentum of everyday concerns for a
large force in such matters as logistics, training, inspec-
tions and policies creates a strange inertia for sudden
crisis management.
In theory the military organization must be more
sensitive to environmental change than civilian forms. The
military must simultaneously sense and react to changes in
the environment of foreign countries- - irrespective of what
is happening on the domestic scene--whether or not civilian
administrators are sensing these changes.
In the free world where military organizations are led
by civilian chiefs of state there is inevitably a delay in
reaction time as that which is sensed by the military is
processed by civilian officials. The burden is thus greater
upon tactical units to sense accurately and to maintain




It behooves the military leader to study the transition
process more carefully if the military organization is to
respond to threats and to maintain communication with its
civilian superiors if constitutions are to be honored. Focus
is needed upon the processes and the variables which con-
stitute this transition.
There are several models which describe the basic




LEAVITT' S MODEL OF ORGANIZATION
Environment
Environment
One possible modification for the military organization
is that if must react both towards its own evironment and
to the environment of its enemy. It is the latter environ-























While the outside environments obviously clash in a
crisis, the internal factors also go through modification.
A closer look at these internal factors is in order.
A. THE GOALS
In a garrison status policy maker set goals and priori
ties within a fairly stable environment. No easy task--
these priorities affect the distribution of national
24

resources (money and people) . In a crisis status the
priorities must shift in the distribution of these resources.
A commonly held idea is that military and diplomatic
activities are interchangeable. General Dayan has said,
"God knows how much I hate wars. With all the pains
the grief and the casualties it causes. But wars are a
natural phenomena in our world. The best way to overcome
them is to win them fast and smooth" [1]
.
In short, time is of the essence.
There is also a need for unified resolve. General
Douglas MacAuthur declared,
"It is fatal to enter any war without the will to win
it" [3].
This kind of goal obviously requires more energy, focus and
commitment than raising recruiting levels by six percent or
economizing on third echelon maintenance.
In line with those priorities set by one's department
of state military leaders look at all the potential military
threats at present and in the near future and attempt to
adjust and reequip on a continuing basis. While the ulti-
mate goals of garrison and crisis postures may be identical
the necessity of breaking this down in garrison life to
milestones and check points invites splintering and detours.
It seems almost necessary that as overall combat goals are
broken down into enabling objectives that there will be a
dilution of concern for the primary goals. There has yet to
be a study of a total military organization to describe the
total effect of this process. Important studies have been
made of individual factors within the garrison environment,
25

e.g., the budget cycle, accident prevention, retention of
personnel, etc. Thus far, we lack a macro-motion-study of
the entire organization as it flexes its objectives while
keeping an overriding goal.
The task of keeping the ultimate, operational goal
primary in combat and in garrison, as is seen in Leavitt's
model is made tenuous by the tugs and changes of people,
technology and structure. Goals broken into subsets such as
the integration of minorities into all branches and echelons
or the elimination of human errors in maintenance will dis-
appear in the heat of combat. Yet the attention to these
subsets greatly influences the readiness of the organization
to respond to a new crisis.
In combat itself there is often conflict between enabling
objectives. The need to withdraw in one theatre to minimize
casualties may threaten a supply route or decrease the
security of an air base. A visit to a command post during
an artillery attack will leave one's ears ringing with
conflicting calls for assistance from subunit commanders.
And yet there can be no hesitancy or uncertainty about the
ultimate goal of the military organization in that crisis.
B. THE TECHNOLOGY
An immediate liaison for military leaders after assessing
present and future threats is 'with what shall we face such
a crisis?' The measures and the equipment used today are
based on the most advanced technology available from science
26

and industry. And there is within the military a constant
cycling of new weapons, sensing apparatus and delivery
systems.
Timeliness is paramount. The lead time for defining the
need for a new weapon system, developing and testing it,
producing it in the required numbers, delivering it and
training people in its use is now considered to be a period
of six to eight years [7] . Such a long lead time cannot be
expected to match the period of transition we have when
moving from garrison to crisis.
It should be noted that the military is assessing,
changing and implementing new equipment and technology con-
tinually. This is done in an evolutionary way. On paper at
least, all the preparations for implementation are proceeding
in advance of delivery. Randomly, it may happen that the
arrival of a system coincides with the advent of a crisis.
However, the impact upon the organization in terms of prepar-
ation for the arrival of the system, redistribution of assets,
training, etc. may already have taken place. Arrival of
new technology may not always produce panic.
At the other extreme it may also be true that a new
system may have arrived and for reasons of cost, shortage of
supply parts, sensitivity or classification it may currently
be in storage. There is a need to deliver the system to
tactical units upon the arrival of a crisis. The impact
upon the organization may not be severe if planning and
scheduling were well done. It has in history, however, not
27

been unknown that some units have received new weapons for
which they had no use, knowledge or preparation. Such an
event illustrates the need for horizontal as well as vertical
communication and planning.
One should also consider the psychological impact on
morale and self-confidence that a sudden and unexpected
change in equipment and technology might have on a military
unit in crisis situations.
In summary, except for minor changes in existing equip-
ment, military organizations are not likely to face sudden
technology changes as an outcome of a short-fuzed crisis.
C. THE PEOPLE
The performance of people in military organizations has
drawn the majority of attention in the literature and rightly
so. Human performance, seemingly vagarious in the combin-
ations of environment, techonolgy, structure and goals, is
difficult to predict and troublesome to observe.
In this study we shall focus upon two groups of people:
leaders and followers. The impact of their interaction can
be summarized,
"Men are neither lions nor sheep. It is the men who
lead them who turn them into either lions or sheep" [8]
.
While Chester Barnard might think this is really a function
of sheep letting their leaders become lions, the point is
that the interaction bears much study.
A most important facet for this study is the selection
and evaluation in peacetime of the best leaders for a
28

wartime environment. Studies continue to isolate the traits
and characteristics of former great leaders in combat.
Theorists have not agreed on a model for selecting the best
and most versatile leader based on peacetime evaluative data.
The situational leadership model is perhaps the most accepted
explanation among scholars [9] .
While it may not yet be possible to predict effective
combat leadership upon garrison performance it does seem
possible to identify those traits and abilities desired in
combat leaders.
"That quality which I wish to see the officers possess
who are at the haed of the troops, is a cool, discriminating
judgement when in action which will enable them to decide
with promptitude how far they can go and ought to go with
propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such
vigor and decision that the soldiers will look up to them
with confidence in the moment of action and obey them with
alacrity.
"
The Duke of Wellington's description is hardly outdated in
its description of desired combat traits for leaders.
Many authorities feel that the people factor of Leavitt's
model is the most amenable to change. Certainly there is an
amazingly wide span for introducing change through the human
element. Through formal and informal channels of communi-
cation leaders can sense differences in their environments
and modify their orders. Over long and intense periods of
time with their subordinates they can introduce expectations,
beliefs and rules of engagement which will reflect the
specific world views of those leaders. This same breadth
also allows, of course, for ample numbers of mistakes in
communication and decision making.
29

One can focus upon particular parts of leadership
problems in combat. Some of these are generalizable to any




One of the first casualties of an organization going
into combat is the time schedule. As iraprotant as the
schedule may have been during garrison life its use in com-
bat is ludicrous. In a crisis nearly everything which is
relevant becomes urgent. There may be a few priorities but
all tasks are to be executed immediately.
Time pressures are especially noticeable to high
ranking officers. Theirs is the job of moving the total
organization in the proper directions immediately. Their
first few decisions are crucial to the success of the tran-
sition from garrison to combat. While there is a need for
more information and the desire to wait before acting until
one has more information all may be lost if some decisions
are not made immediately. Tension and time pressures rise
exponentially among high ranking commanders.
2 Anticipation for Direction
At the lower echelons there is also a need to react
quickly. However, at this level one must wait for the order
to attack, deploy or defend. It is obvious to these units
what the crisis involves. It has already started. As time
and confusion drag on confidence drops. Rumor mongering
increases. If clarifying orders are not soon received,
subordinates will act on the basis of rumors and anticipate
outcomes that may never occur.
30

3 . Need to Complete Previous Assignments
Just as the pregnant wife has been known to want
to complete painting a bedroom after her labor has started
before heading to the hospital, the author has noted a
strange tendency among subordinate leaders to finish old
assignments while waiting for crisis orders. Perhaps they
relieve their personal tension by addressing jobs that
should have been finished prior to the crisis.
Once the crisis orders are issued there is a re-
versal of tensions. Now the senior levels must wait for
feedback saying that their orders have been received and
completed. The sine curves of anticipation levels appear to
be gapped.
Figure 3








It has been observed that no two military crises are
exactly alike. One of the first tasks of senior commanders
is to collect enough data to determine if their reaction
model's assumptions are correct. Variables must be updated.
Missing data makes for increased uncertainty.
31

Top officials tend to centralize activities that
are crisis related, to keep more decisions at their level,
to use intuition and previous experience as fillers to this
uncertainty. It often seems to them that orders need to be
issued immediately, hoping that they can be modified later
if they prove to be inadequate.
At the same time lower echelons are experiencing
conflict between their trust in command and their own inter-
pretation of the crisis situation. They witness the
turbulent environment, hear the rumors and try to update
their own reaction models. Time lags and ambiguity accent-
uates the uncertainty.
5 . Urgency
The reality to both senior and junior levels is that
the immediate environment contains high risk to survival,
because both levels need the other's input there is an in-
crease of vertical communication and some acting out without
sufficiently accurate information. This leads to even
further urgency.
Because of information overload both levels are per-
forming some actions without knowledge to the other level.
Occasionally decisions will be made by an authority who
happens to be available and not necessarily by someone who
is responsible. The thought is that if approval is needed
it can be gained later.
This relates to what was covered earlier concerning
goals and how the subsets can evolve into conflict and
dillution of central goals.
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6. Loss of Identity or Autonomy
An immediate objective at the outset of a military
crisis is to bring all the available resources (manpower and
material) under central command to launch an operational
effort. Anything not having immediate operational importance
moves to a secondary status.
This shift in priorities creates a sudden redistri-
bution of power among individuals within the organization.
Generally, those officers in direct operational billets gain
power while administrative and support departments may lose
resources. In some cases units are "cannabalized" of
people and equipment to reinforce other units. This sudden
loss of autonomy has adverse effects for some individuals.
Along the same vein, operational commanders with
their increased power are able to make more decisions without
receiving the approval of staff assistants and they feel more
power within the boundaries of their own units.
7
.
Changes in Personal Priorities
In garrison existence one's personal priorities are
met in differing degrees. These motivate one to stay with
the unit. In a crisis these personal likes must be sub-
jugated to organizational priorities. The magnitude of the
crisis will determine the extent to which individuals will
relinquish their own priorities, according to S. L. A.
Marshall [11].
Reaction to severe crises is a team effort. Marshall
believes that individuals are willing to give up personal
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priorities such as career fitness reports, family life, etc.
in severe times and that they have an accompanying expecta-
tion that these needs will be met when the crisis is over.
8
.
Change in Direction of Feedback
In a garrison environment the attention of juniors
is centered toward the reactions of superiors. Coping
skills are soon developed to keep seniors happy with one's
work. Feedback is needed from seniors to affirm that.
In a crisis the emphasis changes. The central
emphasis is to get the job done. Now commanders care a lot
more that the organization is working as a team. Commanders
need feedback that their orders are being heard and executed,
Attention is focused more toward subordinates than toward
superiors
.
9 Changes in the Pattern of Personal Skills
As we consider leadership patterns in garrison and
crisis we note a shifting in emphasis of the kinds of skills
needed
.
There are three groups of skills of particular
interest
:
a. Technical and Tactical Skills
These are the skills needed to operate a weapon
system (flying an airplane, maintenance of a tank, etc.) or
to perform standard operating procedures in response to an
air attack, how to direct troops in the field, etc. Many of
these skills are developed through training.
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b. Managerial and Human Skills
These are skills needed to communicate and inter-
vene with other people. The ability to counsel and motivate
others is also amenable to training although less is known
about this form of training.
c. Conceptual and Strategic Skills
These skills represent the ability to analyze data,
design and implement strategies to meet future problems. Such
conceptual ability is influenced by education and experience.
The following theoretical model illustrates the
shifting of these groups of skills going from a garrison to a
crisis environment for three levels of command.
Figure 4























The model suggests that at the lower echelons of
commands technical skills and management skills make up the
major part of a leader's work. The proportions change and
include some conceptual and strategic competency in combat.
At this level in garrison one's daily schedule is usually
prescribed. In combat the schedule is anything but routine
and some conceptual skills are needed to react to the turbu-
lent environment.
At the mid level of command all three groups of
skills are needed in both garrison and combat. In a garrison
status management skills take up a larger portion of the
leader's time than in combat.
Theoretically, at the highest level of command
there is hardly any need for technical skills in a garrison
status. However, in a combat environment senior leaders
must know some technical information to interact more know-
ledgably with subordinates.
This model is hypothetical. It is proposed later
in this thesis to quantify these emphases. Data at the mid-
level of command is reported, analyzed and tested. Future
research may test the applicability of the remaining levels.
D. THE STRUCTURE
The structure of military organizations impacts their
ability to meet goals, utilize people and employ technologies
Formal structures evolve over centuries of experience with
changing environments. The heavy majority of this time,
obviously, is spent in garrison. Informal structures endure
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in both garrison and in combat conditions. Informal structures
tend to be more flexible in meeting unplanned events.
Formal structures have blueprints of the relationships
of departments, officers, positions and programs. These
charts or "wiring diagrams" are accompanied by goal statements
and policy descriptions of how the parts of these structures
are to interact and support the total organization.
Considerable research has shown that organizations rarely
operate according to these formal structures. Dalton (1959)
and Downs (1967) located great gaps between formal and in-
formal structures. When facing especially turbulent environ-
ments formal organizations are often found to be loosely
coupled. March and Olsen (1976) and Weick (1976) found that
in crisis situations organizations are often loosely linked,
that rules are often violated and many decisions are not
implemented.
Enrico L. Quarantelli presented a model to explain the
different kinds of organizations that might exist in a crisis.
Figure 5




Established Type I Tvpe III
Emergent Type II Type IV
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Established organizations, by definition, exist contin-
ually in garrison and in combat. Types I and III represent
regular tasks.
Type II organizations might describe reserve units. They
are emergent organizations called to meet a regular (active)
duty task.
Type IV organizations are rare to civilian or to military
environments. They would not ordinarily be found in the
military unless caught by total surprise or to face a disaster
of some sort. Type II organizations are found frequently in
military units designed to do civic action or counter in-
surgency operations. They are frequently disbanded after the
crisis is ended.
Changes in these structures may be ordered by appropriate
authorities to meet special conditions, e.g., the closing of
a training department to economize on funds. They may also
be the result of previous combat experience of the commander,
executive officer or operations officer.
1 . Centralization of Activities
Combat underscores the need to respond quickly to
changes in the environment. High ranking officers seem to
have a need to be personally involved in tactical decisions.
Command centers are established with a higher than usual
representation of senior officers. This alters the formal




2 . Overload of Communication
As uncertainty and urgency increase in the combat
environment the kinds and amounts of communication increase.
Shaler found in 1974 [6] that the number of relation-
ships (communication channels) may more than triple in combat
in a very short time period. These communications include
passive information to which no response is required but which
consumes a lot of energy in processing and may block other
messages. Active communication- -to which response is re-
quired—can be further divided into operational activities
and support messages. Active, response required messages
will order, clarify and reduce ambiguity for lower levels.
The two way communication also reinforces the expectations of
both parties that supplies will be shipped or that patrols
will commence.
In the case of Type I and Type III units communication
channels already exist and people are trained in their use.
Type II and Type IV organizations experience great difficulty
in establishing regular communication channels. For one thing
the numbers of relationships increase geometrically as reserves
are called back or special units are formed.
Figure 6
RELATIONSHIP OF GROUP SIZE TO COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
q--o c*-~fl Qr«e> s
O O----0 Cf--O y
Members: 3 4 5
Relationships: 6 8 18
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If the unit expands immediately the effect may be a
communication crisis. In the Israeli military organizations
it was found that training 30-60 days a year decreased the
trauma to these communication nets because people were trained
in what to expect when reserve units were activated.
In summary, the military organization is probably among
society's most complex structures. In size and because of
its having to operate in garrison and combat environments it
has many obvious and many hidden variables.
This paper will not attempt to explain all these variables,
What will be explained next is the author's attempt to better
understand what happens to the mid level of management in
going from a garrison to a crisis environment.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF THE TRANSITION STUDY
As was mentioned earlier, the literature reviewed found
no study which traced the transition from garrison to combat
environments for military organizations. A hypothetical
model was designed from fragments of organizational studies
and from experience.
To verify whether or not priorities do shift in this
transition a survey was conducted among United States and
Israeli officers who had commanded units in both garrison
and in combat. It was hoped that additional information
might be gathered to increase our understanding of what else
may happen to commanders during the transition from garrison
to combat.
A. PROCEDURE
The main intent of the survey was to ascertain if there
is a significant difference in the priorities and energies
expended by commanders in garrison and in combat. The null
hypothesis was that there would be no significant difference.
The sample selected was small and unique. All the par-
ticipants were on active duty and had had both garrison and
combat experience as unit commanders. The instrument, tested
first with a small group of officers from other services, was




The instrument (Appendix A) was designed with forced
choice and open ended questions. Realizing that officers
were being asked to recall their priorities and performances
from six to ten years previously it was expected that there
would be difficulty in obtaining accurate perceptions from
them. To assist in getting a more reliable perception three
rankings were asked in both garrison and in a crisis environ-
ment: subjects according to importance, subjects according
to your involvement and subjects according to time commanders
spent on them.
The return rate of 64 percent brought rankings to the
ects generated by a panel of commanders:
fulfillment of goals and training










f communications and openness between you and
your troops
g. career planning and promotions
h. keeping your staff informed of the whole picture
i. planning to face changes in the environment
j. - -open- -write in
k. - -open- -write in
These subjects were first ranked in importance then graded
on a five point scale of importance and graded on a five point
scale in terms of the commanders involvement, for both





Israeli Officers: Level of Importance
In Garrison X
1. Safety in Work 4.833
2. Accomplishment of Training Mission 4.333
3. Enforcement of Regulations 4.083
4. Morale 3.916
5. Communications and Openness 3.916
In Combat
1. Accomplishment of Mission 5.00
2. Morale 4.583
3. Safety in Work 4.083
4. Research and Development 3.583
5. Keeping the Staff Informed 3.583
On this comparison one can see the shift in perceived
importance for the Israelis. In moving from garrison to
combat the subject of safety drops, morale rises and enforce-
ment regulations drops right out of the top five subjects.
Mission accomplishment is naturally uppermost in combat.
It was found that there was considerable similarity
between American and Israeli rankings of these subjects.





Listing of Priorities of Commanders in Garrison and Combat *
Garrison Israeli American
1. Fulfillment of Goals § Training Aids 9.461 9.333
2. Morale 6.615 8.000
3. Safety in Work 6.592 6.937
Combat
1. Accomplishment of Mission 10.000 9.885
2. Morale 7.75 7.375
3. Research § Development in the Unit 6.5 5.6
*high score refers to high priority
Similarly, there is close similarity of responses between
Israeli and Americans in those questions asking how much time
commanders invested in these subjects. Americans, for example,
spent 47.77% of their time on mission accomplishment and
Israelis spent 46.13%. There was more difference between
garrison and combat responses.
C. ANALYSIS
The question arises, are these significant differences
between garrison and combat rankings? Since no assumption of
normality of the distribution of these responses could be made
it was decided to turn to Wilcoxon's Signed-Rank Test of
Difference - Score Population Symmetry about Zero.
James V. Bradley Distribution, Free Statistical Tests
,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., pp 96-102, 1968
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This test has an A. R. E. of 3/TT or .955 relative to the
Matched-Pair Student's Test when both tests are applied under
all assumptions of the latter test. The H of the T test is
that the mean will be zero. The assumption of the Student's
T test is that the population must be symetric about an axis
through its mean.
The null hypothesis for each of the rank comparisons in
this study is that the observations will be symetric about an
axis through a mean equal to zero.
The test statistic is: J> Ri_w+ = n("+1) - w+, Where w+ = Z ,SiRi
ill
2
and W- = E
=
SiRi
Computing this statistic for the three comparisons for the
American and Israelis, i.e., ranking of importance, rating of
involvement and percentage of time spent on the subjects we
get the following levels of significance.
TABLE 5
Levels of Significance in Differences



















The null hypothesis is thus rejected in all cases and it
is stated that each of these comparisons of garrison and
combat rankings is significant at less than the .005 level.
It is felt that this information might be more useful to
military managers if these data were grouped using the model
proposed in Chapter III. In order to be able to compare
across subjects the author prepared psuedo-standardized scores
for each of the subjects by observer, i.e., for each ranking
by a respondent. These Z scores were then pooled into three
categories: Technology; Management; and Strategy. The
following table gives the pooled results and percentages of
commander's ratings.
TABLE 6
Pooled Z Scores for Garrison and Combat Observations
In Categories of Tec hnology, Management and Strate gy
AMERICAN
Garrison Combat
Pooled Z Scores 1 Pooled Z Scores %
Technology 0.8621 58 0.7399 37





Pooled Z Scores % Pooled Z Scores %
Technology 0.9468 40 0.9458 64
Management 0.4840 20 0.3632 25
Strategy 0.9282 40 0.1600 11
46

These results can be displayed in the model suggested
earlier in the following figures.
FIGURE 7










































*These levels still to be studied
While these data at best are preliminary and are subject
to the vagaries of memory by the participants who responded,
they do suggest a way of predicting how managers will need to
shift their priorities in going from garrison to combat.
It may also be a means toward designing training for unit
commanders to better prepare them for combat. With further
study this model might also be used to summarize evaluations





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Basically this paper is an attempt to study and analyse
the impact that changes in the environment have upon the
military organization.
The first observation is that turbulent environments do
cause reactions and changes in the military organization.
Those changes are proportionate to the magnitude of the
phenomena in the environment and to the interpretation of
that phenomena by the military leaders. The impact they have
upon the military varies accordingly. Sometimes it is minor
and can be dealt with by the local, small unit. Sometimes
the change demanded is large, due to the pressure of lack of
time and resources and it needs a combined effort of the whole
organization to face that change.
A second observation is that the skills and techniques
needed to lead the military unit in garrison are quite dif-
ferent in magnitude and priorities than what is needed in a
crisis. In fact, this paper shows that there is a clear shift
in the priorities of the commanding officer under a crisis
environment in respect to his activities and his demands from
his subordinates. Surprisingly these differences in skills
and personalities of commanding officers in the two environ-
ments is not considered as a criteria for evaluation or pro-
motion of officers into command posts.
A third and related observation is that there is also a
shift in the attitudes and the expectations of the subordinates
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toward their organization and especially toward their commanding
officer. Their expectations are highly influenced by their
knowledge and understanding of the procedures and the events
taking place in the environment. Lack of knowledge and mis-
interpretation of the events may lead the military unit into
increased trauma.
A fourth observation is that there is a gap between the
official garrison priorities as ranked by the military
authorities and the crisis priorities actually emphasized by
local commanders. While the former tend to be future-oriented
in support of the ultimate goals of the organization (sort of
a prophetic approach) , the local commanders will tend to
actually spend his time with the everyday problems (the
priestly approach) . Although both types of leadership are
aimed toward the same results on the long run, it seems that
often in the short run there is a large deviation from the
intended and the actual structure and procedures. Sometimes
it is very hard to explain the relevance of that deviation to
the subordinates. It should be noted here that the larger
the deviation in garrison the greater the adjustment needed
when facing a crisis. If this has not been handled well in
advance the subordinates may fail to cope with that sudden
adjustment process.
A fifth observation, basically related to the survey
administered to the commanding officers, is that most of the
preparations to face a crisis are done in the area of techni-
cal and tactical skills while other needs are not directly
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addressed, (It may be done sporadically and individually by
local commanders based on their beliefs, experience and
personality). All the training, standing operating procedures
issued in advance in the military organization are dealing
directly with the operational ability of the unit. This is
based on the assumption that its operations are the most im-
portant and probably the most complicated part. On the other
hand, it seems that other issues, mainly in the area of
managerial skills, e.g., how to deal with battle fatigue or
casualties or how to utilize best your entire resources
(people and equipment) are not addressed so intensively. It
seems as if there are some general rules or general written
regulations in those areas but how to exercise it is mainly
left to the interpretation of the local commander. This is
basically because of the numerous variables that contribute
to this situation and because of the impact the personality
of the local commander has on those type of issues.
Another observation is that the increase in the develop-
ment and the use of the C concept (command, control and
communication) in the military offers high ranking officers
a tool to exercise their need to control activities and raise
the level of decision making when facing a crisis. It seems
that too much emphasis is placed on equipment and technology
and not enough on the human factors.
Last but not least is the author's oberservation that
there is rejection by the military establishment to build a
model of change in priorities to be used by the commanding
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officer as a basic common denominator. The main thrust in
this resistance is the fear that such a model of behavior
might eliminate the creativity and intuition of commanders on
the one hand and might be accepted as a prediction of future
conflict and thus eliminate flexibility and awareness from
the military unit.
Based on this study and the experience of the author the
following recommendations are offered to assist the military
organization to be better prepared to face crises.
A. FURTHER RESEARCH
A thorough and more detailed study within the military
organization should be made of the shift of the priorities in
the different levels of command when the organization is
facing a crisis.
It is felt that a shift in the priorities does exist in
the military organization when facing crises. Due to limita-
tions of time and resources the survey that was done to serve
this paper dealt mainly with commanders at the brigade level
with very few representatives of the other two levels. Even
this narrow-base study showed a significant change in pri-
orities of the commanders when facing a crisis. Since
crisis and combat experience are never alike, a larger survey
is indicated which would relate to larger pools of experience
and might explore other areas of interest, e.g., stress and
communication loads.
Another aspect of such a study is the analysis of the
particular behaviors of commanding officers when facing crises
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The variety of backgrounds in which the commanding officers
were involved and the different approaches they chose might
help us later in building a model of behavior for a commanding
officer in crises.
Since the combat crisis experience might be rare or at
least not necessarily under our control, it is suggested that
the lesson might also be learned in simulation exercises.
It is recommended that sociologists and organization develop-
ment experts join military units in such exercises and make
the necessary studies and analyses to help the local commanders
interpret what happens with respect to shift in priorities and
changes in behavior due to the crisis.
It is also recommended that mechanicsms that will period-
ically study the military organization to see if there are any
gaps between the charted, planned structure and the one that
really exists be created. It is not to say that such a gap
should not be permitted but it should be recognized by the
members of that unit that there is a gap and they should be
aware of the adjustment process that will happen when a crisis
occurs
.
B. EVALUATION AND PROMOTION
The evaluation and the promotion system of officers in
command posts should be updated.
It seems that in both the American and the Israeli eval-
uation sheets (Appendix A and B) , there is no difference
between skills needed in garrison and in crisis and between
skills needed in combat related versus noncombat related
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assignments. It seems that the interpretation of these
different demands are done according to an unwritten scaling
or uncomparable narrative remarks given by each superior
according to his experience and understanding.
Although the system is very aware of the importance and
the contribution of combat commanders in a crisis, the price
for mistakes in nominating the wrong or unsuitable commanding
officer is too high.
It is submitted that even though it is very hard to pre-
dict in a garrison environment who will be a successful
commander in combat we can still go much further in protraying
and analyzing great leaders in the past and list necessary
skills and traits that commanders in a combat crisis should
have
.
A further outcome of such a study would be that a greater
emphasis would be put on training and developing those skills
to build the confidence of both the commanders and the sub-
ordinates in them.
C. GROUP BEHAVIOR
It is suggested that it is very important to have a model
that will predict and analyze the behavior of the military
organization in a crisis. Although there is an awareness of
the claim that such a model might narrow the creativity and
ingenuity of local commanders, it is felt that the combat
military experience already exists, is huge and varied with
circumstances and that there is no other wav to save it for
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future generations of commanders unless by building such a
model. This model should look at different aspects of the
military organization:
1. The behavior of commanders under crisis and in
combat
.
2. The behavior of subordinates under crisis and
in combat.
3. The shift in the priorities at the different
levels of command.
4. The changes in communication channels and flow.
5. The change in expectations of both superiors and
subordinates from each other.
It is realized that such a model is an ambiguous creature.
Each commanding officer in a combat-oriented post has already
built his own model based on his own experience and under-
standing. Sometimes, two commanders of similar units with
basically the same background, will have totally different
models of crisis-oriented behavior. There does not appear to
be any contridication in having a general model which would
combine the past experience of a great number of combat
officers in the past with a model to follow whenever the
commander does not have the experience or the answer for a
certain happening in the environment.
If well explained in advance, there would be no damage to
the ability and creativity of officers. We accept, of course,
the Clausewitz approach that--
"Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds
to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper."
[40]
The best way to preserve combat experience is by simulation
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exercises but if it cannot be done the only other way is by
building the model.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSISTANTS
The military organization becomes more and more compli-
cated and the demands from the commanding officer to be a
specialist in an increasing number of areas is less and less
realistic. It is suggested that the commander should be
given help to deal with the different areas he is expected by
his superiors to control. Among those areas the one that has
thus far been addressed with least experience and knowledge
(although not with less concern) is the human factors of the
military unit. Other areas, dealing with equipment, technology
and tactics have already been confronted. It's felt that any
commanding officer should have an organization specialist to
help him in dealing with the complicated areas of the inter-
facing between the people and the system.
It is clear that there is a difference in the demands for
the consultant relative to the level of command with which he
is involved. The demands, activities and areas of involvement
will be different at the company, brigade, division or the
theatre level because of the difference in the environments
and the difference in experience and priorities of the commander.
There will also be a difference in the involvement and the
productivity of the consultant in respect to the amount of
turbulence or the level of the crisis.
The following table suggests basic activities that the
consultant should concentrate on and perform in the different
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levels of command and changing environment. Of course, all
those activities and additional ones as needed should be
negotiated by the consultant and the commander.
There should be no doubt that in order to succeed the
consultant should be a part of the unit throughout all its
activities in garrison and in combat. The involvement of the
consultant in the different activities of the organization is
part of his establishing status and acceptance by the troops.
In order to be fruitful in an environment with growing uncer-
tainties and pressures, the consultant should be considered
as a natural part of the unit.
As it is often found in command and management theory,
there is no one best answer or procedure to solve a problem.
It is the author's feeling that the subject of this thesis is
very broad and complicated. It is suggested that each of the
recommended steps would contribute greatly to the ability of
the military organization to better cope with crisis situations
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I am LTCOL Ben-Rom from the Israeli Air Force and of present a student
at the Naval Postgraduate School.
This questionnaire is aimed, mainly, to those who served as CO. or X.O.
under combat conditions and whom, I think, have knowledge and experience to
compare the situation in their unit under garrison and in crisis.
This questionnaire is trying to compare commanders views of garrison and
combat/crisis leadership by measuring the difference in your attitude, as a
CO., to these factors. Questions 1 and 2 are looking at your priorities.
Questions 4,5,8 & 9 are aimed at different points of view at what actually
has been done by commanders.
There are empty spaces available for further activities that were important
to you as CO. or X.O. Please feel free to use them.
I realize, of course, that you are ^ery busy and that I am asking you to
recall memories and feelings but I hope you will be able to spend some time
and answer this questionnaire. It will help me very much and might be of
interest to you, also.







Rank the following subjects on a scale of 1 to 5 according to the importance
you relate to each one individually .
1„- Mot important at all
2 r- Of minor importance
3„- Important
4,-- ^Jery important relating to the situation and the environment
5.-- Most important
1. In garrison:
a. fulfillment of goals and training quotas
b. flight/shipboard safety and safety in work
c. enforcement of regulations
d. research and development efforts in your unit
e. morale
f. communications and openness between you and your troops
g. career planning and promotions
h
.
keeping your staff informed of the whole picture
i. planning to face changes in the environment
2. In combat/crisis:
a. accomplishment of missions
b. flight/shipboard safety and safety in work
c. enforcement of regulations
d. inventing new techniques and tactics to overcome difficulties
e. morale
f. consulting your subordinates
g. promoting subordinates
h. keeping your staff informed of the whole picture
i. planning the missions to maximize the survivability of your troops
60

1. As a CO., rank (1 to 9) the following subjects according to their
importance
when your unit is in a garrison status:
a. fulfillment of goals and training quotas
b l flight/shipboard safety and safety in work
c. enforcement of regulations
d. research and development efforts in your unit
e. morale
f. communications and openness between you and your troops
g. career planning and promotions
h. keeping your staff informed of the whole picture
i! planning to Fate changes in the environment
J.
"k.
2. As a CO., rank (1 to 9) the following subjects according to their priorities
in a combat/crisis environment:
a. accomplishment of missions
b. flight/shipboard safety and safety in work
c. enforcement of regulations
d. inventing new techniques and tactics to overcome difficulties
e. morale
f. consulting your subordinates
g. promoting subordinates
h keeping your staff informed of the whole picture
i. planning the missions to maximize the survivability of your troops
J-
k.
3 Compare the two lists above and write down your thoughts according to
the
amount they differ from each other between garrison and crisis. I realize
that
I am calling for the quantifying of feelings and attitudes. What I would
really
like to find out is how large is the gap between garrison and combat for
commanders and which gap is the biggest in your opinion. Please start with
the




8. Estimate the percentage of the time you spent on the following subjects
(I suggest that you will consider one day).
In qarrison:
a. fulfillment of goals and training quotas
b. flight or shipboard safety in work
c. enforcement of regulations
d. research and development efforts in your unit
_e. morale
_f. communications and openness between you and your troops
_g. social activities in the unit
_h. career planning and promotions
J. keeping your staff informed of the whole picture
In combat:
_a. accomplishment of missions
_b. make sure the troops have a good chance to be back safely
c. morale
_d. enforcement of regulations
_e. consulting your subordinates
_g. flight or shipboard safety and safety in work
_h. promoting subordinates
_i. keeping your staff informed of the whole picture
9. List the three people (their position in the unit) with whom you most
frequently communicated:








4. As a CO. in garrison, how would you describe your involvement, on a scale
of 1 to 5 in the activities listed below:
a. fulfillment of goals and training quotas
b. flight/shipboard safety and safety in work
c. enforcement of regulations
d. research and development efforts in your unit
_e. morale
f. communication and openness between you and your troops
_g. social activities in the unit
_h. career planning and promotions
i
.
keeping your staff informed about the whole picture
5. As a CO. in combat how would you describe your involvement, on a scale
of 1 to 5 in the activities listed below:
a. accomplishment of missions
b. make sure that your troops have a good chance to be back safely
c. morale
d. enforcement of regulations
e. consulting your subordinates
f. flight/shipboard safety and safety in work
g. promoting subordinates
h. keeping your staff informed about the whole picture
6. What were the arrangements you made in garrison to make sure you got the
information and the feedback to know what was going on in your unit with
respect to the subjects 1 isted in question number 1?
7. What were the arrangements you made under combat conditions to make sure




11. What do you think the role of a consultant (0/E practitioner) could be
under combat:
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